This PR implements the base foundation of the code signing and integrity check. In this PR implemented is the signing and verification logic, as well as commands to sign single apps or the core repository.
Furthermore, there is a basic implementation to display problems with the code integrity on the update screen.
Code signing basically happens the following way:
- There is a ownCloud Root Certificate authority stored `resources/codesigning/root.crt` (in this PR I also ship the private key which we obviously need to change before a release 😉). This certificate is not intended to be used for signing directly and only is used to sign new certificates.
- Using the `integrity:sign-core` and `integrity:sign-app` commands developers can sign either the core release or a single app. The core release needs to be signed with a certificate that has a CN of `core`, apps need to be signed with a certificate that either has a CN of `core` (shipped apps!) or the AppID.
- The command generates a signature.json file of the following format:
```json
{
"hashes": {
"/filename.php": "2401fed2eea6f2c1027c482a633e8e25cd46701f811e2d2c10dc213fd95fa60e350bccbbebdccc73a042b1a2799f673fbabadc783284cc288e4f1a1eacb74e3d",
"/lib/base.php": "55548cc16b457cd74241990cc9d3b72b6335f2e5f45eee95171da024087d114fcbc2effc3d5818a6d5d55f2ae960ab39fd0414d0c542b72a3b9e08eb21206dd9"
},
"certificate": "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----MIIBvTCCASagAwIBAgIUPvawyqJwCwYazcv7iz16TWxfeUMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF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\niG+UxI/MNcWV0uJg9S63LF8=\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
"signature": "U29tZVNpZ25lZERhdGFFeGFtcGxl"
}
```
`hashes` is an array of all files in the folder with their corresponding SHA512 hashes (this is actually quite cheap to calculate), the `certificate` is the certificate used for signing. It has to be issued by the ownCloud Root Authority and it's CN needs to be permitted to perform the required action. The `signature` is then a signature of the `hashes` which can be verified using the `certificate`.
Steps to do in other PRs, this is already a quite huge one:
- Add nag screen in case the code check fails to ensure that administrators are aware of this.
- Add code verification also to OCC upgrade and unify display code more.
- Add enforced code verification to apps shipped from the appstore with a level of "official"
- Add enfocrced code verification to apps shipped from the appstore that were already signed in a previous release
- Add some developer documentation on how devs can request their own certificate
- Check when installing ownCloud
- Add support for CRLs to allow revoking certificates
**Note:** The upgrade checks are only run when the instance has a defined release channel of `stable` (defined in `version.php`). If you want to test this, you need to change the channel thus and then generate the core signature:
```
➜ master git:(add-integrity-checker) ✗ ./occ integrity:sign-core --privateKey=resources/codesigning/core.key --certificate=resources/codesigning/core.crt
Successfully signed "core"
```
Then increase the version and you should see something like the following:
As you can see a failed code check will not prevent the further update. It will instead just be a notice to the admin. In a next step we will add some nag screen.
For packaging stable releases this requires the following additional steps as a last action before zipping:
1. Run `./occ integrity:sign-core` once
2. Run `./occ integrity:sign-app` _for each_ app. However, this can be simply automated using a simple foreach on the apps folder.
While BREACH requires the following three factors to be effectively exploitable we should add another mitigation:
1. Application must support HTTP compression
2. Response most reflect user-controlled input
3. Response should contain sensitive data
Especially part 2 is with ownCloud not really given since user-input is usually only echoed if a CSRF token has been passed.
To reduce the risk even further it is however sensible to encrypt the CSRF token with a shared secret. Since this will change on every request an attack such as BREACH is not feasible anymore against the CSRF token at least.
* Register OCP\Capability\IManager at DIContainer
* Add register capabilities to appframework
* Register capabilities in DI way
* Make unit test pass again
* Remove CapabiltiesManager from OCP
* This should allow the capabilities to be intergrated into the
appframework
* Unit tests
* Throw exception if closure does not return ICapability instance
In order to properly test the mimetype function:
* constructor takes path to configdir
* Added unit tests for mimetype (only if vfsStream is available)
Roeland Jago Douma
Lukas Reschke
Thomas Müller
Vincent Petry
Robin Appelman
Morris Jobke
Individual IT Services
Frank Karlitschek
Robin McCorkell
Joas Schilling
Roeland Douma
Bjoern Schiessle
root
Roeland Jago Douma
Bernhard Posselt
Robin McCorkell
