To continue this formatting madness, here's a tiny patch that adds
unified formatting for control structures like if and loops as well as
classes, their methods and anonymous functions. This basically forces
the constructs to start on the same line. This is not exactly what PSR2
wants, but I think we can have a few exceptions with "our" style. The
starting of braces on the same line is pracrically standard for our
code.
This also removes and empty lines from method/function bodies at the
beginning and end.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Wurst <christoph@winzerhof-wurst.at>
It was already added to the user template but we should add it to all
templates. Else apps that want the locale but use special templating (hi
richdocuments!) will fail.
Signed-off-by: Roeland Jago Douma <roeland@famdouma.nl>
Use Unified function to emit <link> tags for css loading, obey "Don't Repeat Yourself" ;-)
(Next step might by to combine this with the emit <script> function (even more DRY?) AND move all this to a better place?)
Signed-off-by: Michael Letzgus <michaelletzgus@users.noreply.github.com>
* Create generalized function for emmitting <script defer src=""> tags to templates
* Remove type attribute from inline_js
* Add defer attribute to external <script> tags
Signed-off-by: Michael Letzgus <michaelletzgus@users.noreply.github.com>
CSP nonces are a feature available with CSP v2. Basically instead of saying "JS resources from the same domain are ok to be served" we now say "Ressources from everywhere are allowed as long as they add a `nonce` attribute to the script tag with the right nonce.
At the moment the nonce is basically just a `<?php p(base64_encode($_['requesttoken'])) ?>`, we have to decode the requesttoken since `:` is not an allowed value in the nonce. So if somebody does on their own include JS files (instead of using the `addScript` public API, they now must also include that attribute.)
IE does currently not implement CSP v2, thus there is a whitelist included that delivers the new CSP v2 policy to newer browsers. Check http://caniuse.com/#feat=contentsecuritypolicy2 for the current browser support list. An alternative approach would be to just add `'unsafe-inline'` as well as `'unsafe-inline'` is ignored by CSPv2 when a nonce is set. But this would make this security feature unusable at all in IE. Not worth it at the moment IMO.
Implementing this offers the following advantages:
1. **Security:** As we host resources from the same domain by design we don't have to worry about 'self' anymore being in the whitelist
2. **Performance:** We can move oc.js again to inline JS. This makes the loading way quicker as we don't have to load on every load of a new web page a blocking dynamically non-cached JavaScript file.
If you want to toy with CSP see also https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
Christoph Wurst
Julius Härtl
Gary Kim
Roeland Jago Douma
Dominik Wasielewski
Joas Schilling
Roeland Jago Douma
Jan-Christoph Borchardt
Ralph Slooten
Morris Jobke
John Molakvoæ (skjnldsv)
Michael Letzgus
Lukas Reschke
Robin Appelman
Hendrik Leppelsack
C. Montero Luque
Daniel Aleksandersen
Thomas Müller
maprambo
Lukas Reschke
Volker E
Joas Schilling
Clark Tomlinson