This avoids having to do it at all the places we want cached responses.
We can't inject the ITimeFactor without breaking public API.
However we can perfectly overwrite the service (resulting in the same
testable effect).
Signed-off-by: Roeland Jago Douma <roeland@famdouma.nl>
This is public API and breaks the middlewares of existing apps. Since this also requires maintaining two different code paths for 12 and 13 I'm at the moment voting for reverting this change.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
This makes the new `@BruteForceProtection` annotation more clever and moves the relevant code into it's own middleware.
Basically you can now set `@BruteForceProtection(action=$key)` as annotation and that will make the controller bruteforce protected. However, the difference to before is that you need to call `$responmse->throttle()` to increase the counter. Before the counter was increased every time which leads to all kind of unexpected problems.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
CSP nonces are a feature available with CSP v2. Basically instead of saying "JS resources from the same domain are ok to be served" we now say "Ressources from everywhere are allowed as long as they add a `nonce` attribute to the script tag with the right nonce.
At the moment the nonce is basically just a `<?php p(base64_encode($_['requesttoken'])) ?>`, we have to decode the requesttoken since `:` is not an allowed value in the nonce. So if somebody does on their own include JS files (instead of using the `addScript` public API, they now must also include that attribute.)
IE does currently not implement CSP v2, thus there is a whitelist included that delivers the new CSP v2 policy to newer browsers. Check http://caniuse.com/#feat=contentsecuritypolicy2 for the current browser support list. An alternative approach would be to just add `'unsafe-inline'` as well as `'unsafe-inline'` is ignored by CSPv2 when a nonce is set. But this would make this security feature unusable at all in IE. Not worth it at the moment IMO.
Implementing this offers the following advantages:
1. **Security:** As we host resources from the same domain by design we don't have to worry about 'self' anymore being in the whitelist
2. **Performance:** We can move oc.js again to inline JS. This makes the loading way quicker as we don't have to load on every load of a new web page a blocking dynamically non-cached JavaScript file.
If you want to toy with CSP see also https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
* Introduce simpleFS
* Introduce IAppData
* Introduce AppData Factory to get your AppData folder
* Update FileDisplayResponse
* AppData implements a ISimpleRoot but lazy. So only if an apps starts
to access data will stuff get initialized
Signed-off-by: Roeland Jago Douma <roeland@famdouma.nl>
This cleans up a bit the OCSController/Middleware. Since the 2 versions
of OCS differ a bit. Moved a lot of stuff internal since it is of no
concern to the outside.
The OCS Controller requires a DataResponse object to be returned.
This means that all error handling will have to be done via exceptions
thrown and handling in the middleware.
The OCSResponse differs from other responses in that it defaults to
XML. However we fell back to json by default.
This makes sure that if nothing is set we don't pass anything.
Which defaults then to the controllers default (which is often 'json')
but in the case of the OCSResponse 'xml'.
Roeland Jago Douma
Julius Härtl
Roeland Jago Douma
Joas Schilling
Morris Jobke
Thomas Citharel
Lukas Reschke
Pierre Rudloff
Christoph Wurst
Robin Appelman
Donquixote
Lukas Reschke
Roeland Jago Douma