Any `\OCP\Authentication\IApacheBackend` previously had to implement `getLogoutAttribute` which returns a string.
This string is directly injected into the logout `<a>` tag, so returning something like `href="foo"` would result
in `<a href="foo">`.
This is rather error prone and also in Nextcloud 12 broken as the logout entry has been moved with
054e161eb5 inside the navigation manager where one cannot simply inject attributes.
Thus this feature is broken in Nextcloud 12 which effectively leads to the bug described at nextcloud/user_saml#112,
people cannot logout anymore when using SAML using SLO. Basically in case of SAML you have a SLO url which redirects
you to the IdP and properly logs you out there as well.
Instead of monkey patching the Navigation manager I decided to instead change `\OCP\Authentication\IApacheBackend` to
use `\OCP\Authentication\IApacheBackend::getLogoutUrl` instead where it can return a string with the appropriate logout
URL. Since this functionality is only prominently used in the SAML plugin. Any custom app would need a small change but
I'm not aware of any and there's simply no way to fix this properly otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
The pure CSS loading icon uses an ::after pseudo-element, and thus it
can only be used on container elements; the input element is not a
container element, so when the class "icon-loading-small" is set on an
input element it falls back to a loading icon GIF.
This commit modifies the markup of the login button to add a div element
that holds the confirm icon and the loading icon (depending on the
case). In order to position the icon in the same place as before the
input and the icon are both wrapped by another div making possible to
set the absolute position of the icon relative to the input.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Calviño Sánchez <danxuliu@gmail.com>
* Nextcloud is not properly loaded in the standalone version (especially the theming)
* it is already not listed anymore in the Nginx config (see nextcloud/documentation#392)
* the index.php-free version doesn't support this
Signed-off-by: Morris Jobke <hey@morrisjobke.de>
Use Unified function to emit <link> tags for css loading, obey "Don't Repeat Yourself" ;-)
(Next step might by to combine this with the emit <script> function (even more DRY?) AND move all this to a better place?)
Signed-off-by: Michael Letzgus <michaelletzgus@users.noreply.github.com>
* Create generalized function for emmitting <script defer src=""> tags to templates
* Remove type attribute from inline_js
* Add defer attribute to external <script> tags
Signed-off-by: Michael Letzgus <michaelletzgus@users.noreply.github.com>
* adds a disclaimer that an update via web UI is on own risk
* allows to skip the warning
* fixes#4353
Signed-off-by: Morris Jobke <hey@morrisjobke.de>
This implements the basics for the new app-password based authentication flow for our clients.
The current implementation tries to keep it as simple as possible and works the following way:
1. Unauthenticated client opens `/index.php/login/flow`
2. User will be asked whether they want to grant access to the client
3. If accepted the user has the chance to do so using existing App Token or automatically generate an app password.
If the user chooses to use an existing app token then that one will simply be redirected to the `nc://` protocol handler.
While we can improve on that in the future, I think keeping this smaller at the moment has its advantages. Also, in the
near future we have to think about an automatic migration endpoint so there's that anyways :-)
If the user chooses to use the regular login the following happens:
1. A session state token is written to the session
2. User is redirected to the login page
3. If successfully authenticated they will be redirected to a page redirecting to the POST controller
4. The POST controller will check if the CSRF token as well as the state token is correct, if yes the user will be redirected to the `nc://` protocol handler.
This approach is quite simple but also allows to be extended in the future. One could for example allow external websites to consume this authentication endpoint as well.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
* currently there are two ways to access default values:
OCP\Defaults or OC_Defaults (which is extended by
OCA\Theming\ThemingDefaults)
* our code used a mixture of both of them, which made
it hard to work on theme values
* this extended the public interface with the missing
methods and uses them everywhere to only rely on the
public interface
Signed-off-by: Morris Jobke <hey@morrisjobke.de>
* we introduced this setting in the begining because our
avatar support caused some performance issues, but we
fixed them and should only provide one way how Nextcloud
looks
Signed-off-by: Morris Jobke <hey@morrisjobke.de>
A Two Factor third party App may throw a TwoFactorException()
with a more detailed error message in case the authentication fails.
The 2FA Controller will then display the message of this Exception
to the user.
Working on #26593
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
CSP nonces are a feature available with CSP v2. Basically instead of saying "JS resources from the same domain are ok to be served" we now say "Ressources from everywhere are allowed as long as they add a `nonce` attribute to the script tag with the right nonce.
At the moment the nonce is basically just a `<?php p(base64_encode($_['requesttoken'])) ?>`, we have to decode the requesttoken since `:` is not an allowed value in the nonce. So if somebody does on their own include JS files (instead of using the `addScript` public API, they now must also include that attribute.)
IE does currently not implement CSP v2, thus there is a whitelist included that delivers the new CSP v2 policy to newer browsers. Check http://caniuse.com/#feat=contentsecuritypolicy2 for the current browser support list. An alternative approach would be to just add `'unsafe-inline'` as well as `'unsafe-inline'` is ignored by CSPv2 when a nonce is set. But this would make this security feature unusable at all in IE. Not worth it at the moment IMO.
Implementing this offers the following advantages:
1. **Security:** As we host resources from the same domain by design we don't have to worry about 'self' anymore being in the whitelist
2. **Performance:** We can move oc.js again to inline JS. This makes the loading way quicker as we don't have to load on every load of a new web page a blocking dynamically non-cached JavaScript file.
If you want to toy with CSP see also https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
Jan-Christoph Borchardt
Julius Härtl
Allan Nordhøy
Morris Jobke
Lukas Reschke
Daniel Calviño Sánchez
Joas Schilling
Marin Treselj
Maxence Lange
Michael Letzgus
Bjoern Schiessle
Robin Appelman
Christoph Wurst
Roeland Jago Douma
Pierre Rudloff
Roeland Jago Douma
John Molakvoæ (skjnldsv)
Cornelius Kölbel
Sourav Badami
Felix Epp