Commit Graph

119 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Joas Schilling c20ab0049f
Identify Chromium as Chrome
Signed-off-by: Joas Schilling <coding@schilljs.com>
2016-10-26 12:07:10 +02:00
Lukas Reschke 015affb082
Missing returns + autoloader file
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
2016-10-25 22:13:09 +02:00
Roeland Jago Douma e351ba56f1
Move browserSupportsCspV3 to CSPNonceManager
Signed-off-by: Roeland Jago Douma <roeland@famdouma.nl>
2016-10-25 22:03:10 +02:00
Lukas Reschke 38b3ac8213
Add ContentSecurityPolicyNonceManager
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
2016-10-24 16:35:31 +02:00
Lukas Reschke 9e6634814e
Add support for CSP nonces
CSP nonces are a feature available with CSP v2. Basically instead of saying "JS resources from the same domain are ok to be served" we now say "Ressources from everywhere are allowed as long as they add a `nonce` attribute to the script tag with the right nonce.

At the moment the nonce is basically just a `<?php p(base64_encode($_['requesttoken'])) ?>`, we have to decode the requesttoken since `:` is not an allowed value in the nonce. So if somebody does on their own include JS files (instead of using the `addScript` public API, they now must also include that attribute.)

IE does currently not implement CSP v2, thus there is a whitelist included that delivers the new CSP v2 policy to newer browsers. Check http://caniuse.com/#feat=contentsecuritypolicy2 for the current browser support list. An alternative approach would be to just add `'unsafe-inline'` as well as `'unsafe-inline'` is ignored by CSPv2 when a nonce is set. But this would make this security feature unusable at all in IE. Not worth it at the moment IMO.

Implementing this offers the following advantages:

1. **Security:** As we host resources from the same domain by design we don't have to worry about 'self' anymore being in the whitelist
2. **Performance:** We can move oc.js again to inline JS. This makes the loading way quicker as we don't have to load on every load of a new web page a blocking dynamically non-cached JavaScript file.

If you want to toy with CSP see also https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/

Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
2016-10-24 12:27:50 +02:00
Robin Appelman 6c93fe08f5 dont get bruteforce delay twice 2016-08-29 13:36:49 +02:00
Joas Schilling 0215b004da
Update with robin 2016-07-21 18:13:58 +02:00
Joas Schilling ba87db3fcc
Fix others 2016-07-21 18:13:57 +02:00
Lukas Reschke adf67fac96
JSON encode the values 2016-07-20 22:47:33 +02:00
Lukas Reschke ba4f12baa0
Implement brute force protection
Class Throttler implements the bruteforce protection for security actions in
Nextcloud.

It is working by logging invalid login attempts to the database and slowing
down all login attempts from the same subnet. The max delay is 30 seconds and
the starting delay are 200 milliseconds. (after the first failed login)
2016-07-20 22:08:56 +02:00
Bjoern Schiessle 7c64e1973f
add test for needsRebundling() check 2016-07-11 15:51:48 +02:00
Bjoern Schiessle 49cad153af
always check the mtime of the system bundle and additionally the user specific certificate bundle if a user is given 2016-07-08 18:24:37 +02:00
Johannes Ernst 66a134e69e Disallow certain malformed domain names even if they match the trusted domain expression
Stricter checking for valid domain names
2016-07-06 23:51:04 +00:00
Johannes Ernst 2b4ceae620 Trusted domain wildcard checking made shorter, supporting multiple *
Added test cases
2016-07-06 23:38:30 +00:00
Johannes Ernst 3516b58be6 Duh, no 'next' in PHP.
Use === instead of == for extra paranoia.
2016-07-06 04:51:49 +00:00
Johannes Ernst b1867dc8d1 Allow wildcard * to be used in trusted domains, to support setups where no reliable DNS entry is available (e.g. mDNS) or for simple-to-setup aliasing (e.g. *.example.com) 2016-07-05 18:49:18 +00:00
Lukas Reschke aba539703c
Update license headers 2016-05-26 19:57:24 +02:00
Lukas Reschke 06a4da43ec
[master] Ignore certificate file if it starts with file:// 2016-04-21 19:02:31 +02:00
Roeland Jago Douma 9050e76d95
Move \OC\Security to PSR-4 2016-04-14 19:21:18 +02:00