This fixes a regression caused by 9b668d0, where the css filters to
preview color inversion of the app menu was applied by default. This
commit makes the css filters sensitive on what the current state of the
app menu is.
Signed-off-by: Julius Härtl <jus@bitgrid.net>
Use Unified function to emit <link> tags for css loading, obey "Don't Repeat Yourself" ;-)
(Next step might by to combine this with the emit <script> function (even more DRY?) AND move all this to a better place?)
Signed-off-by: Michael Letzgus <michaelletzgus@users.noreply.github.com>
* Create generalized function for emmitting <script defer src=""> tags to templates
* Remove type attribute from inline_js
* Add defer attribute to external <script> tags
Signed-off-by: Michael Letzgus <michaelletzgus@users.noreply.github.com>
* we introduced this setting in the begining because our
avatar support caused some performance issues, but we
fixed them and should only provide one way how Nextcloud
looks
Signed-off-by: Morris Jobke <hey@morrisjobke.de>
CSP nonces are a feature available with CSP v2. Basically instead of saying "JS resources from the same domain are ok to be served" we now say "Ressources from everywhere are allowed as long as they add a `nonce` attribute to the script tag with the right nonce.
At the moment the nonce is basically just a `<?php p(base64_encode($_['requesttoken'])) ?>`, we have to decode the requesttoken since `:` is not an allowed value in the nonce. So if somebody does on their own include JS files (instead of using the `addScript` public API, they now must also include that attribute.)
IE does currently not implement CSP v2, thus there is a whitelist included that delivers the new CSP v2 policy to newer browsers. Check http://caniuse.com/#feat=contentsecuritypolicy2 for the current browser support list. An alternative approach would be to just add `'unsafe-inline'` as well as `'unsafe-inline'` is ignored by CSPv2 when a nonce is set. But this would make this security feature unusable at all in IE. Not worth it at the moment IMO.
Implementing this offers the following advantages:
1. **Security:** As we host resources from the same domain by design we don't have to worry about 'self' anymore being in the whitelist
2. **Performance:** We can move oc.js again to inline JS. This makes the loading way quicker as we don't have to load on every load of a new web page a blocking dynamically non-cached JavaScript file.
If you want to toy with CSP see also https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
Julius Härtl
Jan-Christoph Borchardt
Joas Schilling
Marin Treselj
Morris Jobke
Maxence Lange
Michael Letzgus
Christoph Wurst
Pierre Rudloff
Roeland Jago Douma
Lukas Reschke
John Molakvoæ (skjnldsv)