With upcoming work for the feature policy header. Splitting this in
smaller classes that just do 1 thing makes sense.
I rather have a few small classes that are tiny and do 1 thing right
(and we all understand what is going on) than have big ones.
Signed-off-by: Roeland Jago Douma <roeland@famdouma.nl>
Using file will overwrite the $file parameter in the template base.
Leading to trying to include a file that is the exception message. Which
will of course fail.
Signed-off-by: Roeland Jago Douma <roeland@famdouma.nl>
This is public API and breaks the middlewares of existing apps. Since this also requires maintaining two different code paths for 12 and 13 I'm at the moment voting for reverting this change.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
This makes the new `@BruteForceProtection` annotation more clever and moves the relevant code into it's own middleware.
Basically you can now set `@BruteForceProtection(action=$key)` as annotation and that will make the controller bruteforce protected. However, the difference to before is that you need to call `$responmse->throttle()` to increase the counter. Before the counter was increased every time which leads to all kind of unexpected problems.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
This allows adding rate limiting via annotations to controllers, as one example:
```
@UserRateThrottle(limit=5, period=100)
@AnonRateThrottle(limit=1, period=100)
```
Would mean that logged-in users can access the page 5 times within 100 seconds, and anonymous users 1 time within 100 seconds. If only an AnonRateThrottle is specified that one will also be applied to logged-in users.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
CSP nonces are a feature available with CSP v2. Basically instead of saying "JS resources from the same domain are ok to be served" we now say "Ressources from everywhere are allowed as long as they add a `nonce` attribute to the script tag with the right nonce.
At the moment the nonce is basically just a `<?php p(base64_encode($_['requesttoken'])) ?>`, we have to decode the requesttoken since `:` is not an allowed value in the nonce. So if somebody does on their own include JS files (instead of using the `addScript` public API, they now must also include that attribute.)
IE does currently not implement CSP v2, thus there is a whitelist included that delivers the new CSP v2 policy to newer browsers. Check http://caniuse.com/#feat=contentsecuritypolicy2 for the current browser support list. An alternative approach would be to just add `'unsafe-inline'` as well as `'unsafe-inline'` is ignored by CSPv2 when a nonce is set. But this would make this security feature unusable at all in IE. Not worth it at the moment IMO.
Implementing this offers the following advantages:
1. **Security:** As we host resources from the same domain by design we don't have to worry about 'self' anymore being in the whitelist
2. **Performance:** We can move oc.js again to inline JS. This makes the loading way quicker as we don't have to load on every load of a new web page a blocking dynamically non-cached JavaScript file.
If you want to toy with CSP see also https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
Roeland Jago Douma
Christoph Wurst
Arthur Schiwon
Julien Veyssier
Morris Jobke
Bjoern Schiessle
Lukas Reschke
Joas Schilling
Lukas Reschke
Roeland Jago Douma